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NOTES.
EFFECT OF A CHANGE OF JUDICIAL DECISION AS TO TIlE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE.-Whether a decision of the highest

court is "law," the equivalent of a statute, or whether it is merely
evidence of the law, has long been a mooted question. This becomes

important where a decision overrules a prior decision on the same
question. Under the view that a decision is merely evidence of the
law. the second decision must necessarily be given a retroactive effect,
while under the other view it can have only a prospective effect and

cannot disturb rights acquired or liabilities incurred under the first
decision. Blackstone says that the court never makes law, but simply
declares What it has always been and an overruled decision never was
law at all.' These conflicting views arise where there is a change
of judicial decision as to the common or unwritten law, as to the
interpretation of a statute, or as to the constitutionality of a statute.
Confining ourselves to the third class of cases, there would seem
to be three situations, which might arise:
I Bl. Comm., p. 7o.
(92)
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i. A statute is enacted, rights acquired or liabilities incurred
thereunder, and subsequently the statute is declared unconstitutional.
2. A statute is enacted, declared constitutional by the court,
rights acquired or liabilities incurred thereunder, and subsequently
the statute is declared unconstitutional.
3. The converse of the second class, the statute 'first being declared unconstitutional and later constitutional.
As to the first situation there is little doubt, as it is almost universally held that a statute declared to be unconstitutional is null and
void from the beginning. No rights or liabilities can be built up under
it. The decision is dated back to the moment the statute was enacted.
This would seem to be in accord with the view that a judicial decision is merely evidence of the 2law, but it has been denied that it
conflicts with the opposite view .
The second situation is of frequent occurrence and comprises
the class of case represented by Gelpcke v. Dubuque.' In this case,
which has given risen to a great amount of discussion, the Legislature of lowa passed a law, authorizing the issue of a certain kind
of municipal bonds. This statute was declared constitutional by the
Supreme Court of Iowa. Certain bonds were then issued and came
into the hands of the plaintiff. After this transaction, the Supreme
Court of Iowa, overruling its former decision, held the statute unconstitutional. On an appeal from the Circuit Court of Iowa to the
United States Supreme Court the plaintiff "s bonds were held valid, despite the latest ruling of the Iowa Supreme Court. It has been suggested by some writers that the decision rests on a question of the
conflict of State and Federal jurisdiction and does not involve the
principle under discussion.' Others hold that the decision can only
be upheld on the theory that a judicial decision is a "law," and that
a decision interpreting or passing on the constitutionality of a statute
becomes a lpart of- the statute itself, and a subsequent overruling
decision has the same effect on it as a repeal by the Legislature has
on the statute itself. Rights acquired under the first decision will be
protected!' One writer frankly admits that this is judicial legislation, but contends that the peculiar nature of our courts permits such
an effect to be given to their decisions.'
Whatever may be said for this view in theory, the weight of
authority is decidedly against it." The strongest argument and perhaps the fundamental one against it appears in a Texas case, where
2

White, "Gelpcke v. Dubuque," p. 56.
Wall. 175.
'4 Harvard Law Rev. 311; 14 Amer. Law Rev. 211.
Hare's Amer. Const. Law, pp. 721-726; Patterson's Federal Restraints on
State Action. pp. 146-147.
'White, "Gelpcke v. Dubuque," pp. 60-84.
Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Co., 138 Pa. 576; Crigler v. Shepler, 79
Kan. 834; Swanson v. Ottumwa, 131 Ia. 540; King v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 195
31

Mo. 290.
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it is said "Under the theory contended for, this court is called upon
to hold that the decision of the Supreme Court of a state, although
erroneously made, could give validity to a statute, which the Legislature had no power to enact and thereby deprive the citizens of the
constitutional rights invaded by the statute," practically amounting
,to a change of the Constitution by the courts instead of by the people."
However, where contract rights are acquired before the overruling
decision, this decision has been held to be a law within the meaning
of the provision of the Constitution that no state shall pass any law
impairing, the obligation of contracts. Henc such contract rights
cannot be disturbed. This so-called "exception" to the general rule
originated in the United States Supreme Court,9 but has since been
distinctly repudiated by that court." It is still followed in some
States,"' but the majority reject it on the ground, that a judicial decision is not a law, or on the ground that even if it is a law it is not
within the intent of the constitutional inhibition, which refers only
to acts of the legislative
power and not to the decisions of the judi2
cial department.'1

On principle it would seem that the same result should be reached
in the third class of cases, as that is simply the converse of the second. For, if no vested right can be acquired under a statute erroneously declared constitutional, no vested right to escape liability or
punishment should be acquired under a statute erroneously declared
unconstitutional. The same fatal objection applies, namely, that it
is setting the decision of 'the court above the Constitution. There
seems to be few cases falling within this class. The situation, however, has been squarely raised in a recent Iowa case.' A statute was
passed making it a crinie to take orders for liquor within the state.
The Supreme Court of Iowa declared this statute unconstitutional.
After this decision the defendant took orders for liquor. Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed itself and declared the statute
constitutional. The defendant was indicted and convicted on the
theory that the second decision had a retrospective effect. On appeal
the conviction was unanimously reversed. Five of the six judges
evade the question under discussion and decide the case on principles
which will hardly bear examination. The sixth, however, meets the
question squarely and holds "that a change of judicial decision involving the constitutionality of an act or construing an act of Legislature, should, like, an act emanating from the law-making power, be
given a prospective rather than a retrospective operation." Also
"decisions of courts construing statutes or declaring them unconstiSStorrie v. Cortes, 9o Texas, 283, per Brown, 1.
'Douglass v. County of Pike, io U. S. 677.
"Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103.
" Haskett v. Maxey. 134 Ind.. 182; Lewis v. Symes, 6i Ohio St. 471; Falconer v. Simmons. 5i V. Va. 172.
"See cases cited note 7. supra.
'. State v. O'Neil. 126 N. W. (Ia.)
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tutional are as much a part of the law of the land as are legislative
enactments. They become part of the body of the law itself and are
not merely the evidences thereof as are decisions relating to the
unwritten or common law." The cases, which fall within this section, seem to be as a- whole, opposed to this view.14 Since no contraci
is involved, the exception rule cannot be pleaded as a defence to the
decision. The fact that it was a criminal case undoubtedly had a
potent influence on the result: Natural justice is certainly upheld by
the decision, for no one can doubt that it is a hard law which punishes a man for doing an act, which was expressly declared to be
legal at the time he committed it. It is probably for this reason
that the criminal cases involving this point have been decided on the
theory that the decision makes the law," although in principle there
seems to be no reason for making the exception. Another reason
advanced in support of these criminal cases is that the second decision
is a violation of the Constitution, which prohibits the passage of any
ex post facto law. An ex post facto law is one which makes an
act innocent when done a crime. It would seem that the same
objections lie against this argument as lie against the argument that
an overruling decision is a law impairing the obligation of contracts.
A. S. S., Jr.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.-In the recent case of Scott v. Union

& Planters' Bank and Trust Co., et al.,1 decided by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, it was sought by the complainant to have established, by a decree of the court, two gifts, alleged to have been made
under circumstances which constitute a valid gift in prospect of
death. -The validity of the gifts was attacked principally on the
ground of insufficient delivery. In the opinion, which granted the
prayer of the bill, the court takes up and discusses the question of
what is a sufficient delivery in donatio mortis causa. The conclusion
reached may best be stated in the language of the court: "An examination of the modern cases all show, while courts will scrutiniie
with care the evidence upon which gifts causa mortis are sought to
be sustained, and will require in every case clear and convincing
proof, yet when it is once ascertained that it is the intention of the
donor to make such a gift, and all is done which is possible under
the circumstances in the matter of delivery, the gift will be sustained." Throughout the opinion and in the cases cited, the intention
of the donor is emphasized as the pivotal point and criterion in the
determination of what should be deemed a delivery in law so as to
" Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86; Stockton v. Dundee Mfg. Co., 22 N. J.
Eq. 56.
'" State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674; State v. Fulton, I49 N. C. 485. See also
Boyd v. State, 53 Ala. 6o8.
130 S. W. 757.
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make a valid gift. The amount and kind of delivery for gifts inter
vivos and mortis causa are treated as being identical. Interpreting
the language of the opinion in the light of the' facts, the case is not
authority for the proposition that any expression of intention to give
by the donor, unaccompanied by an overt act of an attempt at actual
delivery, would be a sufficient delivery to sustain a donatio vtortis
causa; yet the treatment of this class of gifts as requiring the same
kind of delivery as gifts inter vivos would, it seems, if the analogy
is followed closely, lead to such a holding. It is ubmitted that the
distinction between gifts inter vivos and gifts mortis causa should be
constantly kept in mind, and that the peculiarity of this class of gifts,
owing to its origin in notions of equity, and its present conflict,
which is more than apparent, with the statutes of. wills-all these
things should unite to give gifts causa mortis a field to tlemselves
to which they should be closely confined by the law, and in which
their operation should be free from the influence of principles governing inter viz'os transactions.
The validity of a gift made in prospect of death was first recognized in England in Drury v. Smith in 1717." Since that time the
courts of England and America have, with a varied degree of hesitancy, adopted and applied the doctrine announced in that case. It
is to-day"t6o deeply rooted in our law to give any argument against
its wisdom, founded upon the facts of its origin, much weight. However. to throw a light to guide in the application of the doctrine, and
to determine what rules should govern, it may be profitable to recall,
briefly, the causes which gave rise to doltio morris causa.
The validity of this class of gifts was first recognized in the
Roman law, and it is generally admitted, that they owed their existence there to the stringent severity of the civil law in respe:ct to wills.:,
Under the code of Justinian a will or testament was required to be
in writing and signed and sealed by the testator in the presence of
seven witnesses, who had to subscribe their names and affix their
seals. In order to make, take under, or be a witness to a testament,
the person was required to have the testuicnti fa-lio. a term implying such a participation in the law of private Roman citizens as to
exclude over half the inhabitants for one cause or another.' Tle
necessity and techmical manner of naming heirs who were to take
under or whom the testator wished to disinherit in a testament, and
other matters of form which were rigidly enforced. made it practically impossible for anyone not learned in the law to (raft a will.
Thus many persons were not qualified to make wills and those who
were so qualified, but who were overtaken by a sudden illness, were
prevented from disposing of their l)rol)ertv according to their (Iesires. In an effort to remedy this situation, to sonie extent at le:t;t,
the practice of declaring valid oral gifts made inl)rospect of (leath
- P. Wils. 404.
Headley v. Kirby. j8 Pa. 326.
ln~titutes of Justinian. Lib. I, Tit. X. 0 I). XX\II1. i, 22..-.

NOTES.

and properly witnessed arose. But the Roman law guarded these
gifts by the strictest forms of evidence. That it was fraud and
perjury which that law sought to keep down in this class of gifts
by strict requirements, both substantive and evidenciary, would appear from the nature of the r.equirements themselves.'
From the foregoing at least two things may be deduced which
may be useful in determining what circumstances constitute, and
what forms of evidence should be required to prove a gift made in
prospect of death to-day: First, that they were in their inception
recognized as an exception to the law of wills; and, second, that all
the substantive and evidenciary requirements of the Roman law
were calculated to negative fraud and perjury.
The law of England and America has never been as stringent
and exacting in its requirements in reference to wills as was the
Roman law." In the absence, therefore, of many of the causes
which gave rise to this class of gifts, and in the absence of any urgent
need for it, the doctrine has been established in our law. We have
the effect without the cause, and although it may have such intrinsic
merit as to justify its perpetuation, yet it appears that it should be
closely confined to its original scope, and that the same safeguards
should be thrown around it to protect it from abuse through fraud
and perjury.7 The policy which gives a statute precedence over the
common law of a subject which it purports to cover, demands that
this class of gifts, which is an exception to the spirit of the statutes
governing the disposition of property by wills in practically all jurisdictions in this country, be closely construed so as not to further
infringe upon those statutes.
An examination of the cases reveals uniformity in the substantive requirements of gifts made in expectation of death. Personalty
alone can be the subject of such a gift.8 It is agreed that the donor
must be overtaken by an illness of such a serious nature as to put him
in expectation of death." He must clearly show the intent to give.
The gift must take effect presently and is ipso facto revoked by the
donor's survival.'" And, whether as an intrinsic element of the transaction or as a matter of evidence is disputed, it is required that there
be a delivery by the donor to the donee or to some third person as
agent of the donee to complete the delivery to the donee." It has
been in construing what constitutes a valid delivery that the'courts
' Institutes of Justinian, Lib. 1I, Tit. VII, 1 D. XXXIX. 6, 35, 2, 4.
'The formalities attendant upon the execution of a will differ in many of
the States in this country, and for this reason the statutes of the jurisdiction
must be consulted. In the main they follow the Eng. Statute of Wills.
Keepers v. Fidelity Title & Deposit Co. (N. J. Err. and App.), 56 N. 3.
L. (27 Vroom) 302, approving sentiment expressed in Ridden v. Thrall, 125
N. Y. 572.

'In re Hall's Estate. 38 N. Y. Supp. 1135 (N. Y., 1896).
'Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 56 Pa. 166 (I868).
"'Hassell v. Basket. IO7 U. S. 602.
"Ward v. Turner, i Dick. 170.
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have differed in .opinion. As in the principal case, many jurisdictions
place these gifts on the same footing in respect to delivery as gifts
inter vivos.'2 Others will hold a delivery valid in gifts mortis causa
which would not be valid inter z'ivos, and a court of equity will compel the donor's executor to complete the gift.' 3 It would seem that
the latter is the correct view since the object of delivery in the two
cases is entirely different. In the case of a gift inter.vivos a complete
transmutation of possession is necessary to give the donee any rights
whatever in the subject of gift which he can enforce either at law
or in equity. Without it the transaction amounts to nothing more
than an expression of the donor's intention to give. On the other
hand, the purpose of delivery in gifts mortis causa is, since death has
eliminated the witness against whose estate the alleged gift is sought
to be enforced, to prevent fraud and perjury on the part of the
person claiming as donee. And the same extenuating circumstances
which gave rise to gifts inortis causa should,' it seems, come to the
aid of an incomplete inter vivos-delivery to make it a valid delivery
in gifts inortis causa. A.sudden and serious illness which prevents
a man from executing a will may also prevent him from making
manual delivery of objects far distant from his sick bed, or from
executing the power of attorney necessary to transfer a chose in
action intcr vi'os. And if he has done all within his power in the
midst of extreme circumstances, and has shown his desire to make
the gift by such an overt act as would be as capalle of proof as a
manual delivery "would have been capable of proof, then it seems that
the law which respects his desire in permitting him to make such a
gift under any circumstances in exception to a statute of wills, should
also respect that manifest desire by helping to complete the delivery.
Adopting this view. a constructive or symbolic delivery, such as the
handing over of a key to a chest or strong-box in which the subject
of gift is. deposited, or the handing over of a certificate of stock
or a certificate of deposit without a power of attorney executed by
the donor to the donee, which is in many jurisdictions necessary to
transfer them inler z'iz'os, with -words of present gift, should constitute a valid delivery for a gift mortis causa; for it seems that these
acts are as capable of clear proof and as effective in preventing fraud
and perjury as a manual delivery of the subject of gift would be.
If this conclusion be accepted and if the reason supporting it
be sound. it must be conceded that the pivotal point of a valid or
invalid delivery in gifts mortis causa is not alone the proof of the
inten'tion of the donor. It strikes at the nature of that proof, and
is the efficiency of the overt act evidencing that intention to negative
fraud and perjury. Delivery is therefore an evidenciary requirement
in this class of gifts, while it is a substantive requirement in gifts
inter viz'os, and the two should not be confused.
J. F. S.
"Pennington

v. Gittings, 2 G. & J. 208 (Md.); Grymes v. Howe, 49 N.

Y. 17.

"Veal

v. Veal, 27 Beav. 303.
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INJURIES RESULTING FROM FRIGHT OCCASIONED BY AN INVA-

-SION OF THE PRIVACY OF A DWELLING HOUSE.-With the great ex-

tension of the law of tort during recent years, the plaintiff is to-day
allowed a recovery in many cases which, a few years ago, would
hardly have been considered as conferring any right of action. This
sort of legal growth is well illustrated in the case of Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co.1 recently decided. The facts were as follows:
The plaintiff, a married woman, occupied a flat in an apartment
house, and was sick in bed in charge of a nurse. A collector of the
defendant company presented himself at the door of the flat,; which
seems to have been in close proximity to the plaintiff's bedroom, and
demanded admittance in order to read the gas meter. The nurse,
who had opened the door, informed him that they did not use gas,
that there was no meter in the apartment, that the plaintiff was very
ill and that he, the collector, could not come in. The latter then used
loud and profane language and tried to force his way into the flat,
but finally desisted and went away. Shortly after this occurrence,
the plaintiff became much worse and suffered a miscarriage, directly
traceable, as shown by the testimony, to the fright occasioned by the
conduct of the defendant's agent. A suit for damages was brought
and a verdict for the plaintiff was finally had, after a reversal of
the judgment of the trial court.
The facts set forth in the above summary of the case show the
conduct of the defendant's servant to have been utterly unwarranted
and indefensible, and to say that the plaintiff, who through the mental shock received therefrom suffered so seriously physically, could
not have recovered, would have seemed hard indeed. No judge or
jury, considering the matter from a merely moral standpoint, without reference to the technical rules of law would hesitate to award a
woman substantial damages, who had passed through such an experience. But law, as has many times been pointed out, is not morals,
and in consequence, is it possible to uphold the verdict given in the
case under discussion?
While the general opinion seems to be that damages cannot be
recovered for mere fright suffered through the defendant's negligence, a much closer question is presented where physical injury
has followed that fright. Courts have held opposite views upon this
point, but probably the more usual one is that no recovery is possible
in the case of mere negligence 2 where there has been no physical
impact. But it would seem that a different question is presented
where in the place of being merely negligent, the defendant has acted

with a wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, and has wilfully
intended some sort of harm or fright to the latter. As was said in
Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 3 in denying the right to recover-the
129 S. W.

401 (1910).

Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., i5I N. Y. IO7 (I896).
3 168 Mass. 285 (I897).
2
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case being one where the mere negligence of the defendant had resulted in plaintiff's physical injury through fright * * * "It is hardly
necessary to add that this decision does not reach those classes of
action where an intention to cause mental distress or hurt the feelings,
is shown * * * Nor do we include cases of acts done with gross
recklessness or carelessness, showing utter indifference to such consequences when they should have been in the actor's mind."
Admitting, then, that many courts are prone to allow recovery
in this class of case where physical injury results from fright following wanton reckless conduct on the part of the defendant, can
the award in the present case be upheld?
It has always been a fundamental rule of law that to ground an
action some legal right of the plaintiff's must have been invaded.
And yet what right was invaded in this case? Evidently it was not
her right to the peaceful enjoyment of real property, for from the
report, the apartment does not seem to have been in her name. Yet
without having title she could not well found an action of *trespass
quare clausum fregit, and recover consequential damages for her
personal suffering. Nor was her right to personal security violated.
The court distinctly states that there was no assault on the plaintiff, and without an assault an action would hardly have lain under
the strict rules of the old pleading. And yet to a modem mind it
seems but just that she should be compensated.
What, then, is the result in a case of this sort? While the desire
to do justice is strong, the court is hampered by legal rules. It says
consequently that the defendant was a trespasser, and continues that
"the defendant is not to escape responsibility, for as a trespasser
in her home he should respond for all the consequences traceable to
his wrong as the proximate cause thereof." Do they not class him
as a trespasser and allow this action in order to fix on him a responsibility which he would otherwise escape? Is he really a technical
trespasser here in the sense of strict pleading any more than the defendant in Newell v. Whitcher, 4 was a trespasser when he entered
his servant's bedroom? Yet the court in that case'considered him
as such "under the circumstances of the case" and allowed the action
of trespass q. c. f. to be brought by the servant. Many other instances of this sort could be cited,5 ' where the court apparently feeling that there was a right and yet not possibly a legal right of the
plaintiff's invaded, has looked around for some foundation upon
which to permit an action for damages for injuries resulting from
fright due to the invasion of this "right."
Does not this mean then, in the final analysis, that common justice recognizes in such circumstances that the inmates of a dwelling
are entitled to protection from intrusion, and that such protection
Vt. 589 (I88I).
Watson v. Dilts, 116 Ia. 249 (1902).
App.
'Brounback v. Frailey, 78 Ill.
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262

(1898).
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is as much due to all the members of the family, as to the owner of
the premises? If this is the true doctrine of these cases, it probably
will not be long before the courts will yield to the feelings of the
community, and instead of searching for means to bring this new
basis of action within the old forms, will admit freely that, as was
said by the learned judge in his opinion in this case, "The privacy
of the home enjoys the sanctity of the law," and will find a direct
method of enforcing this right to privacy.
G. -K. H.

